Personal Insights & Thoughts: The US-China Conflict in the South China Sea

Troubled Waters: The US-China Conflict Over The South China Sea

(Based on personal research - Nadia)

China’s claims to the vast majority of the South China Sea have created the potential for conflict in the region and necessitates a continued US response. Our goal should be to represent US and international interests both in limiting Chinese expansion and upholding the international order that is threatened by illegal Chinese territorial claims (Standifer). Potential policies that serve to bolster this objective include encouraging ASEAN countries and China to coordinate to hold peaceful operations in and over the region, conducting FONOPs (Freedom of Navigation Operations, or fonops) in conjunction with ASEAN nations, and taking direct military action. The preferred response would be to first conduct fonops on a regular basis without ASEAN nations until a sufficient amount of international support can be gathered and then to coordinate peaceful multilateral operations.

Background:

China’s historical claim to sovereignty over much of the South China Sea has been heavily contested by ASEAN countries and the US. The region’s possibly extensive oil and gas reserves have made it a valuable Chinese asset for reasons other than nationalism (Glaser). Consequently, the fact that the dispute is largely territorial makes it difficult to agree on a zero-sum bargain as there are considerable economic and military advantages to be had for all countries involved (Frieden). Over the past three years China has kickstarted construction of artificial islands that it is safe to assume will be part of a larger armed network of military bases intended to undermine US and ASEAN influence in the region (Emmerson). Following an appeal to a UN tribunal by the Philippines contesting exclusive Chinese control of the Sea, a 2016 UNCLOS ruling discrediting China’s claims was issued. However, the UN had no mechanism with which to enforce its decision and as a result China refused to accept or recognize it (Standifer).

Analysis:

It is imperative to take immediate action to address China’s claims to the South China Sea as continuing to stand on the sidelines will result in Beijing assuming that the US is acquiescing to Chinese expansion (Panda). Our interests are best represented through enforcing international law in favor of maintaining the current power distribution in the region and thereby deterring China from its ambitions.

Option 1: Encourage ASEAN countries and China to coordinate in order to hold peaceful operations (i.e. routine safety procedures, exercises in ecological awareness, and fishery assessments) in and over the South China Sea

The US would make its position of preventing Chinese expansion in violation of international law clear and do so without taking any sort of military action. This would entail both a small economic and/or human cost and likelihood that China would interpret US actions as provocative, thus dissuading them from taking military action themselves. Furthermore, it would act as an assurance to surrounding countries that the US is not interested in ousting Chinese control in the region in order to ensure its own suzerainty in its place (Emmerson). However, ASEAN nations have recently been markedly complacent in their approach to the Chinese expansionist threat, and as a result such a coordination will take time to establish, if it can be established at all (Pertiwi).

Option 2: Make fonops more regular and, by conducting them in conjunction with ASEAN nations, more potent

Fonops will serve to crush China’s fantasies of “indisputable” sovereignty over the South China Sea by asserting that China is still subject to the rules codified in international legislature like the UNCLOS treaty (Panda). Furthermore, a fonop is likely to be well received by the Philippines, a key ally in the dispute, and also demonstrate American concern over potential Chinese control of the region to other Asian powers (Pertiwi). However, ASEAN countries may be unwilling to participate in this form of multilateral opposition given their aforementioned complacent attitude towards China’s recent advances in the region. In addition, while it is in all actors’ best interests to preserve vital maritime trade by upholding the international laws that regulate it, because the nature of the interaction combines elements of both cooperation and bargaining it is unlikely that any country will feel the need to take initiative with the hope that the US, having made the proposal, will instead (Frieden).

Option 3: Take direct military action against China by establishing a redline that makes clear that the US will act if China’s aggressive interceptions of aircraft within its EEZ continues as this is in direct opposition to US domestic and international law (“FON Report for FY”)

It is a known fact that China is increasing its military power, specifically in regards to its submarines and thus poses a security threat to US ships in the region (Glaser). Thus the US is confronted with a security dilemma, as depending on how significant the rate of Chinese military growth is, it may be in our best interests to launch a preventive war. Needless to say, this would result in the most collateral damage and, as is the nature of any security dilemma, it would be hard to pinpoint a definite end to the conflict as we’d be forced to continually expand our presence in the region in response to similar actions by China (Jervis).

Conclusion:

Given the low risk of both a US-only fonop and a peaceful coordination effort with ASEAN nations in terms of provoking China into potential war, these are the best options. Both also fulfil the objective of asserting US disapproval of China’s claims in the region while resulting in minimal expense on our behalf, especially in comparison to taking direct military action. However, given the complacency demonstrated in recent ASEAN relations with China, it will likely take time to coordinate peaceful operations that can be conducted in conjunction with ASEAN nations, so in the interim the US should carry out regular fonops in the region.

Works Cited

Ali, Idrees, and David Brunnstrom. "U.S. Warship Drill Meant to Defy China's Claim over Artificial Island: Officials." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 26 May 2017. Web. 28 June 2017.

Bateman, Sam. "Game on in the South China Sea, U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations." RealClearDefense. RealClearPolitics, 27 May 2017. Web. 28 June 2017.

Emmerson, Donald K. "Xi, the South China Sea, and Mar-a-Lago." The Diplomat. The Diplomat, 6 Apr. 2017. Web. 28 June 2017.

Frieden, Jeffry A., David A. Lake, and Kenneth A. Schultz. World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions. New York: W.W. Norton, 2016. Web. 28 June 2017.

Glaser, Bonnie S. Armed Clash in the South China Sea. Rep. no. 14. Center for Preventative Action, 11 Apr. 2012. Web. 28 June 2017.

Jervis, Robert. Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. Cambridge U, 1977. Web. 28 June 2017.

Panda, Ankit. "The Real Purpose of US Navy ‘freedom of Navigation Operations’ around Disputed South China Sea Islands." South China Morning Post. South China Morning Post Publishers, 28 May 2017. Web. 28 June 2017.

Pertiwi, Sukmawani Bela. "Is China Winning in the South China Sea?" The Diplomat. The Diplomat, 13 May 2017. Web. 28 June 2017.

Standifer, Cid. "A Brief History of U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea." U.S. Naval Institute News. U.S. Naval Institute, 29 May 2017. Web. 28 June 2017.

U.S. Department of Defense. Freedom of Navigation (FON) Report for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2017.